Changes in Foreign Political Thinking, 2004-2006. (In Place of a Foreword) by Glatz, Ferenc
The text below, attached to the first volume of the Centre for Balkan
Studies as a substitute for a Foreword, was written in June 2004, after
the Europe Forum held in Aachen and the Chinese-European cultural
meeting in Beijing. I also presented it at the committee meeting of the
National Strategic Programme of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on
11 June 2004, where I argued for a ’Balkan Project’ to be launched jointly
and for a series of round-table discussions on the European Union to be
broadcast by Duna Television. The television series was broadcast in ten
parts as a monthly feature between June 2004 and May 2005, and the
Balkan Project was launched afterwards, in October 2005. Now the text
is attached to the volume on the Balkans as a foreword, for it was a
functional antecedent of the series of conferences (and activities) on the
Balkans, intending to call the attention of politicians, social scientists and
economic experts to the Southeast European space and to the signifi-
cance of thinking in terms of world politics. We felt and now, in
December 2006, we are still of the view that artificially generated
skirmishes in domestic politics occupy too big a place in Hungarian
public thinking while a too limited space is allocated to world politics.
And that too, at a time when every local activity is being increasingly
determined by global factors…
I. 2004: Narrowing the Horizon of Politics
Changes are necessary in Hungarian foreign political thinking. It is necessary
in the thinking of politicians as well as of entrepreneurs and intellectuals.
In 2004 Hungary became a member of the EU, and now the inhabi-
tants of the country have to learn to think in terms of a territorial
administrative unit of the size of half a continent instead of the borders
of the nation state, they have to plan their mobility and the conditions of
success within the boundaries of the EU.
The extension of the Union borders would continue, and that too, in
a south-eastern direction. No matter what the pace of implementation
will be, this is going to be one of the greatest enterprises of European
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history in the coming decades. Hungary is to be located in the main-
stream of European history. South-eastern enlargement may not only
mean a consumer market for the West European products, it is not only
a forced modernisation for the Balkan region, but it may contribute to
the economic and cultural dynamism of the entire European continent. It
may promote the competitiveness of the continent in global competition.
The inland seas, for instance, of the region may become and presumably
would become the new ports and trans-shipment points of the European-
Asian trade, offering a broader market and mediating activities to the
entire inner European space. It includes the Carpathian basin, too.
The benefits of the Carpathian basin on offer by the south-eastern
enlargement of the Union can be summarised as follows: 1. mediating
traffic between Western and South-Eastern Europe may pass through
here, particularly if it is accompanied by an upturn of European-Asian
trade. 2. The region developing now and to be developed, namely the
Balkans, is contiguous, therefore it has an advantage of having know-
ledge to investments there about the locality, due to its historical,
human and cultural relations. 3. It can have access to sea ports, for the
first time after 1918, which does not facilitate access to the routes of
world trade in general, but enables that local products, part of which is
impossible to sell because of the lack of sea ports, reach the world market.
Intellectual Grumbles 1990–2004
The principles and practice of the foreign political direction of state
administration after the change of the system should be reconsidered.
Comparing the programmes of subsequent governments the principles
respectably strive to pinpoint the place of the Hungarian state in world
and regional policy. The three basic principles on the directions of state
foreign policy still valid evolved by the mid-1990s. They are well known
from political expositions, namely: 1. Euro-Atlantic integration, 2. devel-
opment of a set of regional relations, 3. representing the interests of
Hungarians living beyond the borders. No one challenges their im-
portance. During the past one and a half decades, however, party
programmes and the presentations of the prime ministers in Parliament
as well as government programmes have not been discussed meaning-
fully either by academics or by the society. Foreign policy has a large
number of ’experts’ and ’commentators’ including the author of these
lines. But there are few among historians, political scientists and econo-
mists who have specialised in this field. It is a pity.
It is also a pity that the internal political skirmishes of the system
change, the intensity of changing the guard in positions and in the economy
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(from 1990 on) have diverted attention from the importance of foreign poli-
cy. Just at a time when with the disintegration of the Soviet zone the
mobility range of the state and of the citizens has expanded. And the
attention of the press and of politicians was also diverted by domestic
political fights from the intellectual grumbles: was it really in the interests
of the nation to subordinate the Soviet-Russian relations to such an
extent to anti-Soviet emotions with stupid and swaggering posters in
1990? One should only have the one “Tovarishi konec” (Comrades, /this
is/ the end) in mind (and all this after the Government signed the
agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops in March 1990!). Our view
was retained only on the level of grumbling that the one-sided West
European orientation, dominant in Hungarian history for four hundred
years, should be supplemented. And that too, not only in the direction
of the American continent, which took place rapidly after 1990, but also
towards the Third World, towards China, India, Japan and Eastern
Europe. It was not discussed either and only ’club-like grumbling’ could
be heard about the need for a set of relations on a new basis with Eastern
Europe, with South-Eastern Europe and with the Soviet-Russians. We said
that the one-sided orientation was justified in the 18th to 20th centuries,
for answers to the vital issues of Hungarians were mostly given in the
Western cities. Moreover, it was the Western Great Powers that had
drawn the borders of nation states in our region. The post-1990 unfol-
ding of globalisation, however, offers new opportunities, among others
also in societies outside the Euro-Atlantic space. Paradoxically earlier, in the
1970s and 1980s, and with the passage of time the foreign affairs, party,
administrative as well as commercial and cultural apparatus of the
party-state could cleverly assert our national interests on the ripples of
the political waters of the Soviet Union in that very Euro-Atlantic space.
It is silly – we kept on saying – to constantly subordinate national
interests to the current political dogmas of ideology. As it was done by
the post-1949 administration and corrected with so much achievement
by the post-1974 apparatus despite Soviet occupation. Now, in 2004, it
should be added that we should recognise the eastern and south-eastern
opportunities available to us at least at the time of the eastern enlargement
of the European Union, and we should give up the one-sided Euro-
Atlantic state foreign policy.
Wouldn’t the government creating an Act on Minorities (1993) unique
in Europe have to develop a concept in case the rearrangement of state
borders in Central-Eastern Europe took place? And it did happen in 1992!
Neither the assertion of the post-1938 solutions (Slovakia becoming
independent and Yugoslavia disintegrating), nor the collapse of the
post-1945 model (the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from this space)
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provoked actions from the Hungarian government towards the inter-
national powers. We did not speak about a territorial revision but about
safeguarding minority rights at least to the extent as they were evolved
after the peace treaties of 1919 and 1920, which were not functioning
after 1945 due to the Soviet presence. (Such a draft was drawn up in
academic circles for the management of the minority issue: it was a code
of international behaviour produced in the spring of 1992. It was
forwarded to forums of the European Union. And we distributed it in
several languages also in Western and Eastern Europe. The Government,
though expressing its goodwill, did not link the legal regulation of the
minority issue in Hungary /1993/ to demanding the proposed regu-
lation in Central-Eastern Europe.) In the next period (1994–1995)
pressing for an economic and political role to be taken up by Budapest
also remained an intellectual grumble: the creation of a ’Central-East
European Davos’ was demanded (1994) that could have played a role in
preparing the accession of the region to the Union and its ’EU capabi-
lity’. The special issues of the space could have been exposed on that
forum. The differences of interests from those of the societies of Western
and Northern Europe could have been presented either in the field of
the migration of labour, or of agricultural products and spatial develop-
ment. (These were topics where our lack of preparation has, subse-
quently, caused great disadvantages. And this lack of preparation may
even qualify as a political mistake.)
Today, when we are writing the first summaries of the history of the
period, we are vigorously asking how far state administration helped the
Hungarian society to prepare itself for receiving the norms of the EU and
managing their effects between 1994 and 2004. Or, why at least the state
specialist and self-government apparatus was not prepared for the local
implementation of the Union norms? Why were they not prepared for
discussions with the Union bureaucrats, or at least for asserting local
interests? The historian of posterity is expected to express serious con-
demnation in this field, too.
Then there are intellectual questions probing into the 'lack of concept’, –
already from 1990. Was the trimming of foreign political administration and
of foreign representations right that started already at the time of the
system change, in 1989, under the title of ’deregulation’, otherwise
saving expenses? Deregulation had great merit in slimming down the
internal administration of the state, but many of us hold that it was
’suicidal’ in the field of ’foreign affairs’ from 1989 on. It cut off those
links that were developed practically in all parts of the world on the
basis of bad or good considerations by foreign policy between 1974 and
1989. From 1989 and 1990 on the state at last became an open one, trade,
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enterprise and the movement of persons became free, and was relieved
of the limitations of the Cold War. And precisely then administration cut
off links of representation, links that offered success and advancement to
us, to the great sorrow of us, world wandering intellectuals, tradesmen
and entrepreneurs. (Meanwhile, the internal administration of self-
governments and the state specialist one was once again swelled on the
basis of party political and ideological considerations after 1990.) An
introverted political thinking, unilaterally preferring domestic political power
struggles had become dominant in Hungary, which failed to recognise that
every single classroom, workplace and office was part of a global competition at
the turn of the millennium. And it was not recognised that the existence of a
small nation and state (a small community of taxpayers) is more dependent on
global outlook than ever before. 'Foreign political’ considerations should be
given a larger place in political as well as economic thinking.
Incidentally, does or did any of the administrations have a vision of
what kind of community of Hungarian citizens and nation is envisaged for the
21st century? This question was put by us repeatedly during the past
fifteen years. We imagine a citizen open to the world and moving as an
entrepreneur in it culturally and as an employee or investor as well. We
imagine a person who may find it difficult to find his/her way in the
hectic hustles of Budapest, and in the nerve-wrecking formal and infor-
mal jostles of the inner city, but would be able to feel at home in practi-
cally every corner of the world. And we have imagined (and still imag-
ine) a state that helps its citizens to acquire global competitiveness. It
would help them, among others, by maintaining a stronger-than-average
administration of foreign affairs, and not only in the Ministry. Well, this
has not happened. In 2004 we could add: at least now, as members of
the Union, we should pay attention to world market challenges and
opportunities, those of the economic and cultural market, and we should
consider representations in world politics as a priority branch within the
state administration.
The Globalisation of Politics
The interpretation of ’state foreign policy’ should also be revised. Accord-
ing to our experience it is being done also in the Member States of the
EU. It can be observed that the foreign political administration of the
’Member States’ of the EU is strained by three novel structural conflicts.
1. The globalisation of specialist administrations. 2. Harmony between
following the common foreign policy of the EU and the representation
of the interests of the nation state. 3. The unfolding of integration in
global dimension taking place parallel to the Union and European inte-
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gration, and representing the interests of the nation state within it. Let
us see them item by item.
1. The internationalisation of specialist policies. Historians are fully aware
of the fact that the foreign relations of the country are not limited to
state administration in the modern age, but extend over the system of
international companies and cultural and scientific institutions. And they
also know that international (inter-state) organisations have been formed by
branches, including global ones ever since the beginning of the century
(in the field of trade and economy as well as of culture). Specialised
policies are also being conducted on the international scene, following
the globalisation of production, trade and cultural and scientific activ-
ities. This trend also requires the specialist portfolios of states to conduct
active international (specialist foreign) policy. Thus the 'foreign policy’ of
the state is not restricted to the foreign ministry even within state administra-
tion, as a specialist portfolio, but extends over other ’specialist policies’,
over the specialist portfolios within governance. Hence one of the speci-
ficities of the history of European governmental administration after
WWII has been the establishment of 'foreign affairs’ sections within the speci-
alist portfolios. Another of its specificities is the setting up of so-called
inter-ministerial committees and organisations. A partial objective of it is
to counter-balance over-specialisation hindering a proper survey of
issues, with the aim of creating harmony between the international
activities of branches and the foreign affairs apparatus of the state.
These conflicts became clear to many of us in the Hungarian state
organisation (and also in the state organisation of the Union) when
monitoring of the candidate countries for the European Union began in
1997 (at a time when Hungary still performed very well). Currently only
critical grumbling is heard as yet, about the success in ensuring the effi-
ciency of the ’foreign policy’ (that is European Union) of some branches,
such as agriculture, environment, education, science, etc. How far the
administrators of the special fields, and first of all units of production
and services could be prepared for the Union norms? Did preparation for
the EU excessively focused on the Foreign Ministry function well? (In our
view actually a governmental mistake was made. Shouldn’t one pay at-
tention to repeated ’grumbling’ coming from the academic and
intellectual spheres warning that EU-policy was not simply the business
of the Foreign Ministry? Now it has turned to the detriment of the
country that foreign affairs administration was politically too strong
within the government after 2002 and expropriated ’European policy’.)
2. The interests of the common EU foreign policy and the foreign policies of
the individual Member States. It is visible right now, in the summer of
2004, that the Lisbon ideas (2000) projecting the European Union as one
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of the strongest spatial administrations of world economy by 2010 were
rather wishful thinking only. Undoubtedly it is already seen that the EU
failed to operate the available economic and labour potential with the
required efficiency. Therefore it is not known how far specialist policies
would become ’common Union policies’, in other words, how success-
fully the EU could be evolved into a unit of common spatial administra-
tion and an economic-cultural community with the authorisations of
nation states lifted to Union level. Or, would the British be right who
would still prefer a Union as a federation of associate states in a looser
linkage? The Iraq war has spectacularly shaken the unity of the EU in
the field of foreign policy. It has become clear that the autonomous
movement of interest alliances of nation states and of their adminis-
trations is far stronger than the European (and even European Union)
links. In January 2001 Javier Solana presented still self-confidently the
four principles of the common foreign policy of the EU at the Berlin
Europe Forum, assessing Nice. In May 2004 we were only speaking
about the ‘illusion’ of a common foreign policy at the Aachen Europe
Forum. (At the same place a question was put by a researcher whether
we had any comprehensive ideas about the extent of the shrinking of
the staff of nation-state administrations with the emergence of the com-
mon administration of the EU. The question was received by appreciat-
ing and self-critical laughter breaking out spontaneously.) The prepa-
redness of the special administration of the newly admitted countries for
the implementation of the common harmonisations with the EU was
discussed with the same doubts in May 2004 in Aachen. It should be
admitted though that the foreign ministers and secretaries of state of the
new Member States delivered speeches with the usual, ’obligatory’ opti-
mism and self-assurance (the representative of the Hungarian Govern-
ment was not present). The contributions of the expert reporters, how-
ever, were full of figures testifying that the acceding countries were
unable to present their preparedness for harmonisation, or a required
knowledge of Europe and the adequate language skills. And to remain
with the recent experiences of Aachen, a definite Euroscepticism was
experienced in every country during the preparations for the elections to
the European Parliament and ’disillusionment’ because of ’haggling’
around the constitution. The question is how far the foreign policy of
nation states would be integrated on the level of traditional ’foreign
affairs’, of diplomacy, and how far it would be integrated on the level of
specialist policies (education, agriculture, environment, etc.). According
to my experience a major step forward may be the 'Europeanisation’ of the
different specialist portfolios in the coming years, for it would force un-
restrained integration in production, in trade, in environment protection and in
13
water and nature management. (In those fields of life that are more inde-
pendent of party politics.) Naturally, this tendency would make the re-
consideration of the century-old division of labour between the various specialist
portfolios and the foreign ministry necessary within the state administration.
Today it is not yet seen exactly how the continental and nation-state
administrations would be organically connected. There are uncertainties
present in the administration of every Member State.
3. Global-level and continental (European) integration have been progressing
side by side. Incidentally, in 1992, in the year of the birth of the European
Union it could not be seen precisely what wave of integration would be
brought about by information technology, by the scientific and techno-
logical revolution of our age in the second part of the 1990s. The revolu-
tion of the ’culture of communications’ has profoundly reshaped the
productive organisations, private communications, and the set of cultural
and intellectual contacts within some brief decades. And it is going to
reshape the administrative units, too. It would produce hitherto never
seen global associations of specialisations and branches; it is already
creating entirely new interest alliances in the different points of the
world. To put it simply: it is not at all sure that geographically close local
communities are going to have common interests with their neighbours. The
globalisation of market organisation would split up the interest communities of
geographic and territorial integrations. It is not at all sure that the EU Mem-
ber States would have interest allies within the EU, and it is not known
how far the EU would be able to subordinate ’local’ interests to the
’continental ones’. Or to subordinate relationships that link the individ-
ual Member States or their smaller productive units to an integration
emerging in another part of the world, or to nation states. It is beyond
doubt that the foreign ministries as well as specialist ministries of the
Union Member States would strive to assert the interests of their citizens
in the world market even if it runs counter to continental interests.
The points of consideration could be listed further by us or by others,
prominent authors on foreign affairs literature filling libraries or active
foreign politicians that could be taken into account when shaping a new
strategy of foreign affairs. We are sure only in one thing, namely that
Hungary of little revenue income and few citizens needs a strategy of
foreign policy. It is made necessary by changes taking place in the
Union as well as in world economy and policy. And it is made necessa-
ry by world competition unfolding on the level of the individual, too.
The time is soon to come when the citizen appraises the achievement of local
(state) administration as to how far it serves his and his offspring’s global
competitiveness. And not against the extent how far it serves its impulses,
emotions and aversions, as it does today.
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Widening of the Individual’s Radius of Action
We have been speaking about the necessary changes in foreign political
thinking, about changes not only in state foreign policy, but in the think-
ing of the society as a whole. And first of all we are speaking about
changes in the thinking of entrepreneurs and investors, and of the intellec-
tuals. There is a need for change in their way of daily thinking, when
they design their everyday aims in life, their vocation and occupation,
the education of their children, or just their enterprising investments.
Integration of planetary dimensions as well as within the EU, and its
Southeast European enlargement would offer a framework of life the
size of which is impossible to comprehend as yet. And it also offers a
new set of tools, a new, digitalised set of communication to it. The radius
of thinking and life has never before widened so suddenly and embracing such
space in the five thousand years of modern human history. All those
opportunities that are offered by this expansion of the radius in the field
of investments, the creation of new production systems and the enrich-
ment of knowledge primarily offer space to the middle classes of
entrepreneurs and intellectuals. These are challenges for their daily
activities. And these opportunities may be realised as the result of their
daily activities, they are for the ’production’ of a better quality of life,
for the spread and experiencing of more universal norms of life. Even in
geographic regions like Black Africa, South America, or the regions of
Central Asia where the desired level of the quality of life is just the
creation of a bare physical minimum of existence, it could be relief from
hunger and massive epidemics, just to offer some noble aim also to the
civilisation of the white man so cleverly ’globalising’ in arms trade and
placing goods and capital. It is these middle classes that would have to
demand state administration to operate a school system, research bases
and a diplomacy out of the taxpayer’s money that help them utilise the
new technical possibilities of integration.
How far are these middle strata preparing for the new age of integration?
We are just beginning to issue the first research topics to our students
that may assess this ’preparedness for the world’. We have information
in some areas, but they are quite discouraging. One can hardly find
teaching of European skills in our universities, such as our faculties of
arts. And there are even fewer where this kind of learning is pursued in
foreign languages. The knowledge of foreign languages of our students
may be adequate on paper, but as practicing teachers, and this is the
unanimous experience of professors in the capital city, we find that their
actual operational knowledge of foreign languages is not any better than
it was in the second half of the 1980s. (And what is even sadder the
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level of their understanding of literature related to their subject has
definitely declined even in their mother tongue.) The presence of the
knowledge of world history has not improved in the university and college
education, and strangely enough, interest in these topics has also de-
creased. When talking about these phenomena our teacher colleagues
sadly say that the proportion of knowledge in world economy and
culture has become weaker in the media and primarily in television than
it used to be prior to the system change. (Was it the degradation of the
’Hungarian bases’ of foreign culture and economy that has been faster in
state administration, or has the proportion of global knowledge de-
creased more drastically in television programmes since the change of
the system?) Everything is suppressed by party political cock-fighting
and scatter-brains as well as by the cult of criminal violence.
No matter how much we are arguing with the ’achievement politi-
cians’ of optimistic face, presenting polished series of statistical data
about our system of education and further education, we do not get far.
Hence instead of debates we rather urge for the mobilisation of civil
society and the joining of the forces of the private and public spheres.
June 2004
II. 2005–2006: The Balkan Project
The groups of researchers and professors have been formed already
during the National Strategic Research Programme, launched by the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1996. They have allied to explore the
alternatives opening up before the Hungarian state and Hungarians at
the turn of the millennium. The programmes included were assessing
the level of water management, agriculture, transport, our system of
spatial administration, the culture of a small language, our social care
system, the harmonisation of our institutions with the European Union,
energy management, the protection of nature, etc. In June 2005, when
we undertook the announcement and beginning of a Balkan programme,
we tried to concentrate those forces into a ’team’. We decided on
launching a series of conferences discussing the consequences and
opportunities of the south-eastern enlargement of the EU, with the parti-
cipation of academic experts and the entrepreneurial sphere, as well as
governmental and civil organisations. We decided upon the creation of a
homepage and its operation as an electronic periodical to be updated
monthly. (In Hungarian, for the time being, but also in English from the
second half of 2007.) The homepage contains the texts of presentations
and contributions to those conferences. The edited texts are also to be
published in Hungarian and in English.
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The Balkan Project was launched in October 2005. The Programme
Committee has members from Hungarian institutes of the HAS, of
universities as well as representatives of foreign institutions (Austria,
Slovakia, and Romania) besides the initiator Europe Institute Budapest.
The idea was supported by the then Foreign Minister Mr Ferenc Somo-
gyi, who kindly accepted to give the first talk at the opening conference.
Between November 2005 and October 2006 we held conferences (alto-
gether six) on the following issues: What human rights conflicts would
be strengthened in the Union by the accession of the Balkan region and
the gradual admission of its states into the European Union? How could
the European spatial integration programmes (the INTERREGs) promote
the integration of the Balkan region into the Central-East European sys-
tems of production and transport? What prospects Hungary and the
states of the Carpathian basin have at the building of the new European
transport corridors? What role the Danube may play as a European
transport corridor (the seventh) and the Carpathian basin in general in
the water management of South-Eastern Europe? What common prob-
lems may be caused by the intercontinental changes of climate in the
Carpathian basin and in the Balkan region? Into what new world
economic environment would the Balkan region be included and what
kind of opportunities open up for Hungary during the enlargement of
the EU? Would the Balkan states and those of the Carpathian basin be
competitors or regions of co-operation in food production?
Now the readers may receive the edited variant of the presentations of
these conferences, and they are recommended to click on homepage
www.balkancenter.hu that publishes our current news of the Balkans as
a result of the work of the editorial office under the management of
József Juhász and Andrea Antal.
We are glad to see that our modest initiative has been only one of
those actions that encourage state policy since our accession to the EU in
2004 to develop a more marked concept of foreign policy. Moreover,
they are challenging even the foreign political preferences of the pre-
vious years. (Such comprehensive and critical analyses can be read in
the volume of papers entitled “Hungarian Foreign Policy in the 20th
Century”, and our readers’ attention is called to this publication, espe-
cially to papers criticising the present situation by László Kiss J., Péter
Tálas, László Póti, and Zsuzsa Szilágyi discussing our Balkan policy. The
volume was edited by Ferenc Gazdag and László J. Kiss.)
*
We are of the view that every institution and every individual should
perform ’his own task’ with whatever modest means are at his/her dis-
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posal. How would the result of our effort manifest itself is unknown.
But we have already met a professor of noble thinking “enriched by his
intelligence” who has deposited a sum not insignificant even in inter-
national dimensions for the study of the Danube valley and the gateway
to the Balkans. He is one of the founders of the Europe Institute who
has advanced finances for several years for the expenses of our location
in the university. And we have won assistance at the strategic tender of
the HAS for our homepage and conferences, for the edition of our
publications, and we were invited to report on the aims of the Balkan
Project and its public benefit at the Prime Minister’s Office to the invited
guests of governmental administration.
Meanwhile we are not only grumbling, not only simply criticising,
but are making recommendations. We wish to promote thinking about
our place in the world, in Europe and in Central-Eastern Europe.
December 2006.
Ferenc Glatz
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